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DE FACTO SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND THE
"STATE ACTION" REQUIREMENT: A SUGGESTED NEW
APPROACH
While many of our institutions have a tendency to divide us-
religious institutions, social institutions, economic institutions,
political institutions-the public school. . is the one unique
institution which has the capacity to unite this nation and to
unite this diverse and pluralistic society that we have.*
Since Brown1 was decided in 1954, it has been clear that racial se-
gregation in the public schools contravenes the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment when required, enforced, or encouraged by
color or under operation of law. Today, the time for "all deliberate
speed"2 has long past. Only if so-called "freedom of choice" plans pro-
cure the most efficient possible termination of racial dualism will they
pass constitutional muster.3 Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education4 makes clear that further evasion or delay in complying with
the mandate of Brown will not be tolerated. Moreover, the Supreme
Court recently reaffirmed the broad scope of equity power that may be
employed to rectify the effects of de jure segregation.' However, the
Court has not yet passed judgment on schools whose racial imbalance is
primarily the product of external factors other than the force of law or
the actions of the school authorities.6 This note asserts that such de facto
segregation also contravenes the fourteenth amendment.
DE FACTO AND DE JURE SEGREGATION PRESENT
THE SAME NUCLEUS OF OPERATIVE FACT
Jurisprudentially, law can be thought of in two ways. One is the
traditional notion of stare decisis. Utilizing the body of decided cases as
a frame of reference, this approach standardizes challenge and response.
Current controversies are then stated and resolved in terms of those fixed
legal symbols, and the same precedents simultaneously circumscribe the
* Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599, 627
(S.D. Tex. 1970) (emphasis added).
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
3. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
4. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
5. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
6. Id. at 23. However, it granted certiorari in such a case on January 17, 1972,
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507), and heard oral
argument on October 12. 41 U.S.L.W. 3201 (S. Ct 1972).
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law's application.7 Such a conception of the legal process is funda-
mentally normative.'
But law has a managerial dimension as -well. As a tool for social
engineering, it seeks to channel behavior and expectation in the light of
approved social values. The managerialist approaches law as a body of
internally consistent, continuously reviewed conduct-directives designed to
effect certain desired behavior.' Since his aim is to account for all the
relevant factors that determine individual life and group existence," he
must make "a disciplined use of all relevant modes of thinking and obser-
vation.""
Brownt and its progeny are fundamentally exercises in the mana-
gerial function of law. Drawing heavily on the social sciences,' Chief
justice Warren, writing for the Court in Brown, reasoned:
Segregation. . . in public schools has a detrimental effect upon
7. For example, contract law refuses to sanction nominal consideration because
it was not recognized at common law. Cogent policy considerations favor the recogni-
tion of nominal consideration. See Brody, An Exercise in Sociological Jurisprudence:
Herein the Signal Theory, 20 DEPAUL L. Pv. 791 (1971) ; Fuller, Consideration and
Form, 41 CoLum, L. Rav. 799 (1941). Nevertheless, both the courts and the com-
mentators have rejected it. E.g., Marsh v. Lott, 8 Cal. App. 384, 97 P.2d 163 (1908) ; 1
A. Coani, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTs §§ 110-12, 130-31 (2d ed. 1963); 1 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 107, 115, 115A-115 C (3d ed. 1957).
S. Chroust, The Managerial Function of Law, 34 BOsT. U. L. Rav. 261, 261-62
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Chroust].
9. Id. at 273. See generally Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75
H~av. L. REv. 463 (1962).
10. Chroust, supra note 8, at 283-84. See generally Trubek, Toward a Social
Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of 'Law and Development, 82 Y.ALx L.J. 1
(1972).
11. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 Aa,. J. ComP. LAW
24, 25 n.3 (1952).
12. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.9 (1954). The Court's reliance
on this data provoked an enduring controversy. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U. L.
R.Ev. 182 (1956) ; Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's
Role, 5 VmL. L. REv. 224 (1959) ; Greenberg, Social Scientists Take the Stand:
Review and Appraisal of Their Testimony in Litigation, 54 Mich. L. Rav. 953 (1956) ;
Rose, The Social Scientist as an Expert Witness, 40 MINN. L. REv. 205 (1956); Van
den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the Desegregation Cases-a Reply to Professor
Kenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. Ray. 69 (1960) ; Verba, The Supreme Court, Segregation,
and Social Research, 31 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1957). The critics' most telling point was
that constitutional rights should have firmer foundations than the sifting sands of socio-
logical research. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 150, 157-58, 167 (1955);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rav. 1,
31-34 (1959). However, the test applied by the managerialists is in fact pragmatic:
does a given measure promote, retard, or defeat attainment of the desired goal policy?
What that policy is, and whether the means at hand are adequate or adapted to its
realization, must be constantly ascertained anew. Chroust, supra note 8, at 269.
Therefore, the Court would properly overrule Brown if the data on which it rests is
ever found defective to any significant degree.
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the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of law; for the policy of separating the races is generally
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency
to [retard] the educational and mental development of Negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would
receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.3
The analysis suggested in this note proceeds on the assumption that the
constitutionally significant fact of Brown was segregation's harmful im-
pact on black children, rather than the origin and nature of the segrega-
tion itself. This assumption proceeds from an interpretation of Brown's
language. Although Brown spoke only of the detrimental psychological
effects of state enforced school segregation, its conclusion that this '"im-
pact is greater when it has the sanction of law"'" indicates that the Court
believed that such harmful impact is present, although perhaps to a lesser
degree, in any racially identifiable school.
That minority-group children attending racially identifiable schools
perform less well than do their white peers attending predominately white
schools in an empirically verified fact. 5 The controversy centers on
whether racially identifiable, objectively inferior schools are the primary
cause of this disparity. The poor performance of black children has been
ascribed variously to matriarchal black family structure,"8 black socio-
economic status,"7 and even inherently lower black intelligence quotients.'
However, despite these controvesial opinions," the general consensus
13. 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting the three-judge court's finding of fact No. VIII
in the Kansas case). See Record at 245-46, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
14. 347 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
15. 3. COLEMAN, EQUALrrY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTuNITY 20-21, 218-75, 325
(1966) [hereinafter cited as COLEMAN].
16. D. MOYNIHAN, TiE NEGRo FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL AcTION 36-
38 (1965).
17. COLEMAN, supra note 15, at 275-325.
18. Jensen, How Much Can. We Boost I.Q. and Scholastic Achievement?, 39
HARv. EDuc. Rav. 1 (1968); Jensen, Reducing the Heredity-Environment Uncertainty:
A Reply, 39 HARv. EDuc. REV. 449 (1969). See generally C. JENCES, INEQUALITY:
A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AmERICA 266-319
(1972) [hereinafter cited as JENCiS]I; Herrnstein, "I.Q.", THE ATLANTIC, Sept., 1971,
at 43-64.
19. The methodology employed, as well as the results reached, have been attacked.
See, e.g., Bowles & Levin, The Determinants of Scholastic Achievement - an Ap-
praisal of Some Recent Evidence, 3 J. HU MAN RESOURCES 3 (1968) ; Bowles & Levin,
More on Multicollinearity and the Effectiveness of Schools, 3 J. HUMAN RESOuRCES
393 (1968) ; Deutsch, Happenings on the Way Back to the Forum: Social Science, I.Q.,
and Race Differences Revisited, 39 HARv. EDuc. REv. 523 (1969) ; Goodman, De Facto
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remains that this phenomenon is in some measure a correlative of the
racially identifiable nature of the schools in question.2"
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. Rxv. 275,
400-35 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goodman]; Light & Smith, Social Allocation
Models of Intelligence: A Methodological Inquiry, 39 HARv. EDUC. REv. 484 (1969) ;
Stinchcombe, Envirownent: The Cumulation of Effects is Yet to be Understood, 39
HAnv. Eouc. REv. 511 (1969).
20. This note is predicated on the adverse psychological impact of de facto school
scgregation. "Equal education opportunity," if measured in terms of objective input
and output alone, is an unsatisfactory constitutional standard for purposes of racial
integration:
[A] child has a greater educational opportunity in a school with children
from backgrounds that are educationally stronger. . . . It's probably not
appropriate to say on achievement grounds alone that segregated schooling
does not provide equality of educational opportunity. There is not sufficient
evidence to show that the kind of benefits to lower-class children that arise
from a socio-economically heterogeneous or racially heterogeneous school
can't also be provided by other means. . . In this sense, judges have
looked at that study and used the results more strongly than the results
warranted.
Coleman on the Coleman Report, THE EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER, Mar., 1972, at 13,
13-14. Cf. JENcs, supra note 18, at 29-33, 97-106, 135-75, 320-50. Substandard academic
performance appears to be an evolute of class rather than race. COLEFAIN, S1pra.
note 15. See generally A WILSON, THE CONSEQUENCES OF SEGREGATION: ACHIEVE-
MENT IN A NORTHERN COMMUNITY (1969); Long, Test Results of Third Grade
Negro Children Selected on the Basis of Socio-Econoinic Status (pts. 1-2), 4 J.
NEGRO EDuc. 192, 523 (1935) ; Nam, Rhodes & Herriott, School Retention by Race,
Religion, and Socioeconomic Status, 3 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 171 (1968) ; Wilson,
Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys, 24
Air. Soc. REV. 836 (1959). If improved scholastic attainments by black children in
integrated settings are due to their insertion into an achievement-oriented, middle-class
milieu - and Armor, The Evidence on Busing, THE PuBLIc INTEREST, Summer, 1972,
at 90, challenges this basic assumption - that makes a good case for integrating the
schools along socio-economic lines. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 313 F.
Supp. 90, 96-99 (D. Colo. 1970). But it provides no support for balancing the races
as such. Cohen, Defining Racial Equality in Education, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 255 (1969).
However, as a practical matter, there are so few middle-class blacks that even attempts
to strike a socio-economic balance in the schools will entail de facto integration for the
foreseeable future.
Courts are on equally shaky ground if they limit their scrutiny to such dis-
parities as the gap in per-pupil expenditures between black and white schools. Serrano
v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971), suggests that the
proper remedy for such discrepancies in objective inputs is an equalized allocation
of educational resources. See also Rodriquez v. San Antonio Independent School
Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972);
Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill,
118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187, appeal docketed, No. 86108, N.J., Feb. 29, 1972.
Cf. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476, 479 (1971); Sweetwater County Planning
Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), juris. relinquished, 493 P.2d 1050
(Wyo. 1972) ; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 564, 594-98 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Fiss]. But see
Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), affd meim., 397 U.S. 44
(1970) ; Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968)A affd mer. sub nora.
Mc nnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Milliken v. Green, - Mich. -, 203 N.W.2d
457 (1972), rehearing granted, No. S3809, Mich., Feb.'1, 1973; Spano v. Bd. of Educ.,
68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972). The equal protection clause
may be "the cutting edge of our expanding constitutional liberty." Hobson v. Hansen,
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In part, the root causes of this phenomenon are psychological. Racial
discrimination contributes directly to psychological deprivation."1 Segre-
gation has corrosive effects on all parties concerned. Its perpetrators
develop an irrational sense of innate racial superiority, while the disdained
group lives with the constant knowledge that it is looked down upon and,
if it lacks a cultural base on which to build a sense of self-esteem, is sub-
ject to constant pressure to feel ashamed and resentful of inherited char-
acteristics.
The connection between segregation and negative self-image may be
indirect,22 but it is nonetheless real. It has been extensively documented
in the case of blacks.22 However, it is not a psychological mutation unique
to them. Both Puerto Rican24 and Chicano25 children, when subjected
to similar segregated conditions, evidence the same psychological depri-
vations as black children. It appears to be a function of minority status-
269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.D.C. 1967). However, the managerial function of the law
must tailor its conduct-directives exactly. If they are not organic outgrowths of the
initial hypothesis behind a chosen goal, they cannot logically be employed to further
realization of that goal. Chroust, supra note 8, at 268. Therefore, unless the evidence
of de facto segregation's adverse psychological impact is firm enough to sustain
imposition of a duty to correct the situation, decrees couched in terms of racial balance
lack the internal consistency essential in a rule of law. Cf. Goodman, supra note 19.
21. E. SIMPsoN, DEMOCRACY'S STEPCHILDREN: A STUDY OF NEED AND BELIEF
118-34 (1971).
22. It has been diagrammed as follows:
Not
White cupidity --> Negro suffering
but
White cupidity
creates
Social and Personal Responses which serve to sustain the individual in
his punishing world but also generate aggressiveness toward the self and
others
which results in
Suffering directly inflicted by Negroes on themselves and others.
Rainwater, Crucible of Identity: the Negro Lower-Class Family, in THE NEGRO
AMERICAN 172, 175 (T. Parsons & K. Clark ed. 1966).
23. See, e.g., J. NELSON & F. BESAG, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPEcTIVES IN EDUCATION:
MODELS FOR ANALYSIS 154-65 (1970).
24. Jessup, School Integration and Minority Group Achievement, in THE URBAN
R's: RACE RELATIONS AS THE PROBLEM IN URBAN EDUCATION 90, table 5 (R. Dentler,
B. Mackler & M. Warshauer eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Jessup].
25. T. CARTER, MEXICAN AMERICANS IN SCHOOL: A HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL
NEGLECT 45, table 7 (1970) ; Project Report: De Jure Segregation of Chicanos in
Texas Schools, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REv. 307 (1972). Interestingly,
Japanese-Americans fail to display this connection despite racial visibility and a culture
traditionally thought of as alien. Caudill & de Vos, Achievement, Culture, and Per-
sonality: the Case of the Japanese Anericans, in SCHOOL CHILDREN IN AN URBAN
SLUM: READING IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 311 (J. Roberts ed. 1967).
For a catalogue of the literature, see M. WEINBERG, THE EDUCATION OF THE
MINORITY CHILD: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 10,000 SELECTED ENTRIES
(1970) (updated bi-monthly in the periodical INTEGRATED EDUCATION).
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be it racial, ethnic, or religious in nature. Internalizing the dominant
society's perceptions of them, minority-group children learn to look on
themselves with contempt. 6 This negative self-image adversely affects
both their aspirations for the future' and their motivation to learn."
Self-concept is admittedly a broad notion. Even selecting the vari-
ables by which to define and measure it is difficult ;29 thus, to factor out
the effects of non-school forces in molding the psyche of black children
borders on the impossible." However, perceptible (albeit slight) im-
provement in their self-image has been observed in the aftermath of inte-
gration.3 This leads to the conclusion that, in at least some degree, the
racial composition of the student body accounts for the lower self-concepts
of minority-group children trapped in racially imbalanced schools. The
force of law may aggravate this detrimental psychological impact but the
same harmful effects exist nonetheless. Even though the evidence of the
correlation between racially identifiable schools and psychological harm
to black children is far from conclusive, courts are justified in drawing
this inference since the harm that results to black children if this connec-
26. For a particularly searing account of this process, see J. KozoL, DEATH AT AN
EARLY AGE: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF NEGRO CHILDREN IN
THE BOSTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967). However, the underlying assumption that
minority-group children have self-images lower than those of their white peers has
been challenged. Soars & Soars, Self-Perceptions of Culturally Disadvantaged Children,
6 Air. EDuc. RESEARCH J. 31 (1969).
27. Boyd, The Levels of Aspiration of White and Negro Children in a Non-
Segregated Elementary School, 36 J. Soc. PsYCH. 191 (1952) ; Gist & Bennett,
Aspirations of Negro and White Students, 42 Soc. FORCES 40 (1963) ; Holloway &
Berreman, The Educational and Occupational Aspirations and Plans of Negro and
White Male Elementary School Students, 2 THE PAC. Soc. REV. 56 (1959) ;
Stephenson, Mobility Orientation and Stratification of 1000 Ninth Graders, 22 AM.
Soc. REv. 204 (1957). However, for a skeptical reappraisal of the evidence on this
point, see St. John, The Effect of Segregation on the Aspirations of Negro Youth,
36 HALv. EDuC. REV. 284 (1966).
28. Jessup, supra note 24, at 93. The change in self-concept does not parallel
the changes in achievement rating, but the lag can probably be attributed to various
socio-economic factors. Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools - Part 11:
the General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U. L. REv. 157, 192-211 (1963) (hereinafter
cited as Kaplan II]; Katz, Academic Motivation and Equal Educational Opportunity,
38 HARv. EDUC. REV. 57 (1968).
29. Crowne & Stephens, Self-Acceptance and Self-Evaluative Behavior: a
Critique of Methodology, 58 PSYCH. BULL. 104 (1961). See generally Dyer,
Some Thoughts About Future Studies, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPOR-
TUNITY: PAPERS DERIVING FROM THE HARVARD UNIVERSITY FACULTY SEMINAR ON
THE COLEM11AN REPORT 384 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
30. See generally Bronfenbrenner, The Psychological Costs of Quality and
Inequality in Education, in INQUIRIES INTO THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF EDUCATION
251 (A. Lightfoot ed. 1972).
31. See Jessup, supra note 24, at 92, 93. But see COLEMAN, supra note 15, at
323-24; Clark & Clark, Racial Identification and Preferrence i; Negro Children, in
READING IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 551, 559-60 (G. Swanson, T. Newcombe & E.
Hartley eds. 1952).
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tion does exist would be irremediable later in life. It will be time enough
to reexamine this premise when and if a concensus emerges among social
scientists that racial imbalance is neutral so far as ego development is
concerned.
A PATTERN AND PRACTICE OF DIScRIMINATORY
SCHOOL BOARD ACTION OFFENDS THE FOURTEENTi AMENDMENT
Despite the absence of formal legal compulsion, schools in the North
and West are effectively segregated de facto as any in the South were
de jure."2 By every objective standard, they no more pass constitutional
muster than did their Southern counterparts at the time of Brown.8"
Nevertheless, to bring de facto segregation within the purview of Brown,
the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment must first be
satisfied.
"State action" is a label of shifting content. It demands government
action-in-fact. However, the specific authority that the state vests in its
officials is not what connects their actions to it. The true link is the power
that they possess by virtue of their position alone,34 and so "state action"
embraces "all. . . action of every kind. sanctioned in some way by
32. See generally H. MILLER & R. Woocu, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION
348-49, table 9.1 (1970). See also NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS
OFFICIALS, PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION AND INTEGRATION IN THE NORTH 13-21
(1963); Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64
CoLum. L. REv. 193, 216-17 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Bickel]; Maslow, De Facto
Public School Segregation, 6 VILL. L .REv. 353, 354-55 & n.18 (1961) ; Wright, Public
School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto School Segregation, 40
N.Y.U. L. REv. 285, 290-91 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wright].
33. Comparison of White, Integrated, and Negro Schools in Chicago: 1962
Type of School
Indicies of Comparison White Integrated Negro
Total appropriation per pupil $324.00 $320.00 $269.00
Annual teacher's salary per pupil 246.00 231.00 220.00
Percent uncertified teachers 12.00 23.00 49.00
No. pupils per classroom 30.95 34.95 46.80
Library resources per pupil 5.00 3.50 2.50
Expenditures per pupil other
than teacher's salaries 86.00 90.00 49.00
St. Claire Drake, The Social and Economic Status of the Negro in the United States,
94 DAEDALUS 771, 783 (1965). See also Peck & Cohen, The Social Context of De
Facto School Segregation, 16 W. REs. L. REv. 572, 590-95 (1965). Comparable data
for pre-Brozwn Southern schools may be found in H. AsHMoRE, THE NEGRO AND THE
SCHOOLS 144-61 (1954).
34. Thus a state cannot disclaim responsibility under the fourteenth amendment
simply because its agent acted outside the scope of his authority. Lewis, The Meaning
of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REv. 1083, 1086 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Lewis];
ef. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961) (construing "under color of law"
as used in 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
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the State."3 However, before state action is constitutionally offensive,
both (1) a causal connection between the governmental action and its
alleged discriminatory impact"' and (2) an intent to discriminate 7 must
be proved. The first requirement demands that there be a nexus between
the action complained of and the state sufficient to impute that action to
the state as its own." The second factor requires a showing that the
35. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883).
36. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. I'vis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), although dealing with
allegedly state supported private discrimination, is significant because it stands as the
Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the "causal connection" requirement
of state action.
In Moose Lodge, a bona fide private club refused service to Irvis, a guest of a
member in good standing, for the stated reason that he was black. Lodge 107 held a
liquor license from the state of Pennsylvania, which has a detailed, comprehensive
scheme for issuing these licenses and regulating the licensees. PA. STAT. ANx. tit. 47, §
1-101 et seq. (1969). For a succinct outline of the operation of this scheme, see
Judge Freedman's opinion for the three-judge court below, 318 F. Supp. 1246, 1248-50
(M. D. Pa. 1970). One requirement imposed by the Liquor Control Board is that
"every club licensee shall adhere to all the provisions of its constitution and by-laws."
REG. OF THE PA. LIgUOR CONTROL BD., § 113.09 (1970) (quoted in 407 U.S. at 177).
Local Moose lodges are bound by the constitution and by-laws of the Supreme
Lodge, which limit membership to white males over twenty-one years old. CoNsT. OF
THE SuPREE LODGE OF THE WORLD, LOYAL ORDER OF THE MoosE § 71-1 (1971).
The issue before the Court was whether Pennsylvania's pervasive liquor regulations
sufficiently connected the state with Lodge 107's exclusion of Irvis so as to bring
that action within the scope of the equal protection clause.
In itself, Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme was not enough to activate the
amendment. In the words of Justice Rehnquist:
The Court has never held . . . that discrimination by an otherwise private
entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity
receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is
subject to state regulation in any degree whatever. Since state-furnished
services include such necessities of life as electricity, water, and police and
fire protection, such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between
private as distinguished from State conduct...
407 U.S. at 173. Had Pennsylvania done no more than issue a liquor license to Lodge
107, the fact that the Lodge barred blacks would not have put the state in the position
of "lend[ing] its authority to the sordid business of racial discrimination." Adickes
v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 191 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). But Pennsylvania went further. By requiring club licensees to
adhere to all provisions of their constitution and by-laws, it put its weight behind
the racially restrictive policies of the Loyal Order of Moose. A local lodge could
not have admitted blacks even if it wanted to, without risking loss of its license.
On this point, the Court held that Pennsylvania had allowed its power to control
liquor distribution to be exploited in pursuit of racial discrimination. 407 U.S. at
177-78. In sum, under Moose Lodge, a causal link must tie the discrimination com-
plained of directly to state action.
37. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).
38. The Fourteenth Amendment . . . implies that there are matters of
fundamental justice that the citizens of the United States consider so essentially
an ingredient of human rights as to require a restraint on action on behalf of
any state that appears to ignore them.
Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 1957) (emphasis
added). That is our constitutional heritage, but the "original understanding" con-
templated the protection of basic rights against private action as well. Frank & Munro,
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governmental body has manifested an outward expression of racial pre-
judice by its discriminatory action. 9 The mere harboring of personal at-
titudes of racial prejudice by state officials will not suffice.4"
Both of these requirements are missing from genuinely unadulter-
ated de facto segregation. "State action" was undeniably present in the
case of de jure segregation. The several states are bodies politic and
sovereign, and can act only through their officers and agents. Boards of
education-whether themselves appointed or elected, whether of state-
wide jurisdiction or restricted to one local political subdivision thereof-
are by their very nature instruments of the state. When its constitution
and statutes mandate racial separation of the public schools, board com-
pliance with these dictates is without a doubt "state action" in the con-
stitutional sense. The lines are more blurred, however, when we come to
de facto segregation. By de facto segregation, we mean racially identifi-
able schools whose imbalance is the product of external factors other than
the force of law or the action of the school authorities. Although
"[r]acial segregation and racial imbalance are two names for the same
phenomenon, racial separation .... ,, residential housing patterns do
more than any board policies to determine the racial balance of schools.
De facto segregation results primarily from long-range demographic
trends, and these trends lie beyond the ability of school authorities to con-
trol or influence in any significant degree. The neighborhood school is
not per se unconstitutional42 since geographic zoning is objectively "rea-
The Original Understanding of Equal Protection of the Law, 1972 WAsH. U. L.Q.
421. How, then, can the "state action" gloss be explained?
The 1876 Hayes-Tilden election marked not only the final withdrawal of federal
troops from the South, but also the end of Reconstruction as well. The North
plainly abandoned that fight and turned its attention elsewhere. Maslow & Robinson,
Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality, 20 U. CmI. L. REv. 363, 370-71
(1953). Did the Court read those auguries and decide the Civil Rights Cases ac-
cordingly? Like the Continuum Hypothesis, it is an assertion that cannot be proved
and yet cannot be disproved. But some support for the idea can be gleaned from
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1323
(1952).
39. Sengstock & Sengstock, Disxrimination - a Constitutional Dilemmna, 9 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 59, 59-60 (1967). See also Buchanan, Federal Regulation of Private
Racial Prejudice: a Study of Law in Search of Morality, 56 IowA L. REv. 473, 526-30
(1971).
40. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 178 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).
41. Sprangler v. Pasedena City School Bd., 311 F. Supp. 501, 506 n.4 (C.D.
Cal. 1970).
42. Brown itself seems to implicitly sanction the neighborhood school concept,
for among the relevant factors in dismantling dual schools are
problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of
the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, [and] revision
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sonable in relation to its subject"43 as an administrative tool for assigning
children to schools.4" In that context, mere continued adherence to a long-
standing neighborhood school plan uideviated from in the past is not
tantamount to a law compelling segregation.45
The second requirement for constitutionally offensive "state action"-
intent to discriminate-is mainly a proof problem in the de facto area.
A "realistic racism"4 6 will draw attendance zone boundaries to produce
as much racial dualism as possible. But rare indeed will be the admission
that such decisions rest on considerations other than efficient operation
of an effective school system,4" even though alternate lines would be
equally justified geographically and would also result in less imbalance. 8
If these intricacies and problems of applying the "state action" re-
quirement to, de facto school segregation eventually work to prevent
eradication of segregation's harm to school children, the continued use of
of school districts and attendance areas into compact itits to achieve a
system of determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis.
349 U.S. at 300 (emphasis added). Apparently the Court envisioned the end-product
of desegregation to be unitary school systems based on residential zoning, either absolute
or modified by some sort of transfer system to insure against resegregation. Bickel,
supra note 32, at 212.
43. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). Cf. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
44. Among the advantages claimed for neighborhood schools are: (1) such schools
are small; (2) parental interest in the schools is fostered; (3) a feeling of security
is engendered in the children by familiar surroundings; and (4) the cheapest, fastest,
and safest means of transportation between home and school can be employed. These
factors are critically assayed in 'T. WEiNBERG, RACE AND PLACE: A LEGAL HISTORY
OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOL 2-36 (1967).
45. Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965). See
also Balaban v. Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d 438, 445-46, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574, 581-82 (2d
Dept.) (dictum), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d 375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied,
379 U.S. 881 (1964). But see Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There Is
But One Constitution, 7 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REv. 1 (1972) ; Fiss, The
Charlottc-Mecklenberg Case - Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation, 38
U. Cur. L. REv. 697 (1971) ; Sedler, School Segregation in the North and West:
Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis U. L.J. 228 (1963); Small, The Path and the Promised
Land: School Desegregation, 21 Am. U. L. REv. 636 (1972) ; Wright, supra note 32.
46. A. BICxEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 62 (1962).
47. Northern school boards are said to prefer the term "racial imbalance" to
"de facto segregation" because it carries no overtones of racial motivation on their part.
Fiss, supra note 20, at 565-66.
48. Clark & Burns, The Realpolitik of Racial Segregation in Northern Public
Schools: Some Pragmatic Approaches, 14 How. L.J. 217, 219-20 (1968) ; Note, Racial
Imbalance in Public Schools - Legislative Motive and the Constitution, 50 VA. L. REv.
464, 495-502 (1964). Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 162 F. Supp. 372 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd on limited grounds, 358 U.S. 101 (1958). For a graphic portrayal of the dif-
ficulties facing the plaintiff in an ably defended de facto school segregation case,
see Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools - Part III: The Gary Litigation,
59 Nw. U. L. Ray. 121, 133-55 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan III].
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the requirement in its traditional form becomes suspect. What is needed,
apparently, is a new approach to the "state action" problem.
SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF: A PROPOSAL
The difficulties in applying the state action requirement to de facto
school segregation have gotten in the way of what should be our prim-
ary concern after Brown: the adverse psychological impact of racial
segregation. Black children attending schools segregated-in-fact are not
going to draw fine distinctions between the de jure or de facto roots of
their inferior education. If the "state action" requirement of the four-
teenth amendment would thwart attempts to correct this wrong, then
"the logic of words must yield to the logic of realities."4
Awareness of this has led many courts confronted with de facto
segregation to take a broad view of state action."0 Reasoning that the
state's left hand cannot eschew knowledge of what its right hand is doing,
those judges have held racially imbalanced schools to be unconstitutional
if any government agency has played a significant role in fostering the
underlying residential segregation."1 That approach goes too far. In
49. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605 (1908). To
restrict inquiry to the "original understanding" of the Constitution, or the meaning
of its words at the time it was written, is to risk letting the past blind us to the present.
Historical continuity is really a search for evolutionary change over time. Public
affairs are the raw materials of constitutional law, and so challenged institutions
must be scrutinized in terms of their present function as well as their historical
beginnings. Chroust, supra note 8, at 270-72, 274-75 n.38; Clark, The Function of
Law in a Democratic Society, 9 U. Cma. L. REv. 393, 4000 (1942). The role of history
is to sensitize the Court to the complexities of the matter before it for decision. C.
MILLER, THE SuPREmE COURT AND THE USES OF HIsToIY (1969); Wifford, The
Blinding Light: the Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L.
REv. 502 (1964). Therefore, the Court properly employed history when it appraised
de jure segregation in Brown. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HRv. L. REv. 1 (1955) ; Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered:
the Segregation uestion, 54 Mica. L. Rxv. 1049 (1956). But see Avins, Shool Segre-
gation and History Revisited, 15 CATE. LAw. 308 (1969).
50. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 592 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
final decree entered, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich.), affd in part and remandcd in
part, No. 72-1809 (6th Cir., Dec. 8, 1972), motion for rehearing "en banc" granted,
No. 72-1814 (6th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal.), appeal docketed sub nora. Jones v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., No. 71-1877 (9th Cir., July 29, 1971), stay denied sub norm. Lee
v. Johnson, 92 S. Ct. 14 (1971) (Douglas, Circuit Justice) ; United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1461 (7th Cir.,
Feb. 2, 1973); Davis v. School Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734, 742, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1970),
aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971).
51. While it would be unfair to charge the present defendants [the Detroit
Board of Education] with what other governmental officers or agencies have
done, it can be said that the actions or the failure to act by the responsible
school authorities, both city and state, were linked to that of these other
governmental units. When we speak of governmental action we should not
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orthodox constitutional theory, the desired relief has been tied directly
to the particular state involvement cited as the basis for activating the
fourteenth amendment. Proof that courts, 2 public housing authorities,"8
or the federal government54 helped to create existing housing segrega-
tion makes a good case for open housing. It does not support a school
desegregation decree. The chain linking the relief sought to the state
agency from which it is demanded must be plain and direct.
A better, and more constitutionally correct, approach than a broad
view of state action would be to place a heavy presumption of uncon-
stitutionality on any racially identifiable school. It would then be incum-
bent on the board of education, if it pleads the defense of genuinely un-
adulterated de facto segregation, to show that no discrimination on its
part played a role in producing that racial dualism. The initial burden of
proof should rest with the party alleging racial animus on the part of
education authorities. However, once he has made a prima facie showing
of conduct claimed to have fostered segregation-in-fact, and its present
substantial existence in the schools, the burden of persuasion would shift
to the defendant board of education. " It must then come forward with
view the different agencies as a collection of unrelated units. Perhaps the
most that can be said is that all of them, including the school authorities,
are, in part, responsible for the segregated condition which exists.
Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582, 587 (E. D. Mich. 1971), final decree entered,
345 F. Supp. 914 (E. D. Mich.), aff'd in part and remanded in part, No. 72-1809
(6th Cir., Dec. 8, 1972), motion for rehearing "en banc" granted, No. 72-1814 (6th
Cir., Jan. 16, 1973). See also United States v. Board of School Comn'rs, 332 F. Supp.
655, 663, 674 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1461 (7th Cir., Feb. 2, 1973).
52. Racial covenants were routinely enforced within the city of Indianapolis
until 1948, when they were declared unconstitutional. Such covenants were common
among the traditionally white, middle- and upper-class neighborhoods of Indianapolis.
United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 662 (S.D. Ind. 1971),
aff'd, No. 71-1461 (7th Cir., Feb. 2, 1973). Contrast Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948), and Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136 Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252
(1957), with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), and Charlotte Park & Recreation
Comm. v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955).
53. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436
F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971). See also the authorities
collected in note 101 infra.
54. See generally Grier & Grier, Equality and Beyond: Housing Segregation in the
Great Society, 95 DAEDALUS 77, 82-85 (1966).
55. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971);
Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844, 854-55 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. School
Dist. 151, 286 F. Supp. 786, 797, 798 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th
Cir.), permanent injunction granted, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969), inwdified and
aff'd, 432 F.2d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971); Taylor
v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 185-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See generally Rousselot,
Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes in the Public Schools of the
North and West: the Emerging Role of Private Constitutional Litigation, 35 GEo.
WAsH. L. Rxv. 698, 698-700 (1967).
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clear and compelling evidence that de facto segregation is genuinely un-
adulterated in order to establish that defense. To apportion the burden
of proof in this manner could at times penalize the board on only a cir-
cumstantial showing of an intent to discriminate." But racial innuendoes
command a degree of vigilance57 high enough to justify that risk. "Only
by sifting the facts and weighing [the] circumstances" in this way "can
the nonobvious involvement of the State. .. be attributed its true signi-
ficance.""
Allocating the burden of proof in this manner does not collapse the
de jure-de facto distinction. Although the difference is a question of
degree, not kind, it is not a relatively arbitrary determination to make.
De jure segregation is primarily the result of an affirmative course of
conduct mandated by the state, even if enforced by custom and tradition
as well as by law. De facto segregation in the schools is primarily the
result of long-range demographic trends. That is the essential difference,
The plaintiffs failed to meet their initial burden of proof in Gomperts v. Chase,
329 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Spencer v. Kungler, 326 F. Supp. 1235 (D.NJ.
1971), affd, 404 U.S. 1027 (1972); Parris v. School Comm., 305 F. Supp. 356 (D.
Mass. 1969); Johnson v. Hunger, 266 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Keller v.
Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1406 (Calif. Super. Ct.
1963). In Keller, for example, the half-black Stanford Junior High burned to the
ground less than a month before the opening of the 1963-64 school year. The board
of education temporarily assigned its students to predominately white Peter Lassen
junior High on a double-shift basis, and simultaneously began a study to determine
whether to build a replacement school. (and if so, where). Meanwhile, it also erected
mobile classrooms on the old Stanford site and, pending completion of its study, re-
assigned Stanford's students and faculty there for the second semester. Its action
to relieve the overcrowding at Peter Lassen was held insufficient to justify a pre-
liminary injunction against permanent relocation. Equity's intervention would be
premature, for a decision as to permanent relocation had not yet been made.
56. Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at Athens: The Fourteenth
Amenddment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WAsHr. U.L.Q. 383, 394-97 [hereinafter
cited as Karst] ; Note, Presumption of Unconstitutionality Applied to Pupil Place-
ment Plai, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 546, 553 (1963). To render a decision against the board on
the basis of such a circumstantial showing is, in effect, to make proof of its mens rea
unessential to the plaintiff's case. However, similar standards have been adhered to
in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (municipal services);
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968)
(urban renewal) ; Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd mer., 371
U.S. 37 (1962) (voter registration); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296
F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 922 (1971) (public housing). See generally Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong
Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARv.
CIv. RiGHTs - Civ. Lm. L. Rav. 441 (1971).
57. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 10 (1967); Mclaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 n.11 (1956) ; Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ; Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). See generally McKay, Political Thickets
and Crazy Quilts: Reapportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REv. 645,
666-67 (1963).
58. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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and the burden-shifting approach developed in this note preserves that
distinction. The question is not did the school authorities cause segrega-
tion by their actions, but did they have a policy of segregation as evidenced
by their actions ?"' Under either a broad state action or a burden-shifting
approach, a strong case can be made for finding a fourteenth amendment
violation if a court (1) isolates discriminatory gerrymandering of attend-
ance zones or similar actions in the past; (2) determines that the lines
drawn or policies settled on at that time are still in use; and (3) establishes
present segregation-in-fact-even though that racial imbalance is mainly
a by-product of forces other than the actions of school authorities."0 But
to term such a state of affairs de jure segregation is a misnomer. Demo-
graphic trends, not board policies, are at the heart of the matter.
In the present context, holding school authorities accountable does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 1
Boards of education are in a position either to ratify or modify the im-
balance occasioned by population shifts. Compact zones can be variously
shaped;2 decisions regarding siting new schools, demarcating attendance
boundaries, and so forth are for the board to make, and its decisions can-
not be influenced by a policy of racial segregation in order to accommodate
community sentiment." If these decisions are so influenced, the school
59. Note, Racial Imbalance in Public Schools: Constitutional Dimensions and
Jud&,ial Response, 18 VAXD. L. REv. 1290, 1301 (1965).
60. Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), final decree entered,
195 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940
(1961), makes this clear. The board tried to defend on the basis that population
shifts would have segregated the Lincoln School by 1960, even had the 1930-34
gerrymander never occurred, but its plea was unavailing. Kaplan, Segregation Litiga-
tion and the Schools - Part I: The New Rochelle Experience, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 1,
5-7, 16-19, 36-43 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan I]. But see Downs v. Board of
Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (desegregation plan
producing racial imbalance approved on finding "bona fide" board intentions).
61. Milliken v. M eyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
62. Fiss, supra note 20, at 599. To quote Balabon v. Rubin, 20 App. Div. 2d
438, 248 N.Y.S.2d 574 (2d Dept. 1964) :
. . . the 51 white children on whose behalf this proceeding was instituted
live closer to or no further from J.H.S. 275 than from J.H.S. 285. There-
fore, J.H.S. 275 is the school in the district of their residence. . . . The
argument that these children live in East Flatbush (in which J.H.S. 285 is
located) and, therefore, that J.HT.S. 275 (which is in Brownsville) is not
a school in the district of their residence is without merit. These area
names are purely artificial; there is no defined boundary line between them.
Legal rights may not be founded on such nebulous geopraphic neighborhoods.
Id. at 443, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 579. See also DeFelice v. Board of Educ., No. 71 Civ. 502(E.D.N.Y., April 10, 1972) (adherence to borough lines in fixing high school zones
unconstitutional if racial segregation results).
63. Buchanan v. XVarley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917); Davis v. School Dist., 309
F. Supp. 734, 742 (E.D. Mich. 1970), afj'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. School Dist. 151, 301 F. Supp. 201, 206 (N.D.
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authorities are estopped from later disavowing the de jure overtones of
their actions."4
DISTINGUISHING BELL AND ANALYZING EYES
The contrary result in Bell v. School City of Gary"5 does not defeat
the approach to "state action" advocated herein. In espousing the dictum
that "the Constitution . . . does not require integration," 8 the court
in Bell acknowledged that board of education policies had colored the
situation but, in view of the clear white-to-black population trend in the
city,67 attributed no legal significance to them. In view of the racial
animus which permeates the school history of Gary, that conclusion must
be deemed erroneous. De jure segregated schools existed there until
1947.6" For example, separate, racially homogenous plants stood side-
by-side at the Pulaski complex ;6 school authorities explicitly designated
Roosevelt High as a "black" high school in 1938 ;" black students attend-
ing Froebel, the one integrated school in the entire system, could use its
swimming pool only on Fridays-and then just before the water was
changed !"' Even the shift to geographic zoning had racial connotations.
Close on the heels of a refusal by thirteen whites to attend school with
blacks at Froebel, a community-wide white boycott developed in 1945.
However, the board of education stood its ground. The white protesters
then demanded nondiscriminatory admission of blacks to all the white
schools in Gary rather than just Froebel, and, in 1947, the board agreed. "
I11. 1969), modified and affd, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
943 (1971).
64. Cf. Dyson, Looking-Glass Law: an Analysis of the Ginzberg Case, 28
U. PirTr. L. REv. 1 (1966).
65. 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.), aff'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 924 '(1964).
66. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
67. Kaplan III, supra note 48, at 123 n.12.
68. The Bell court fixed their terminal date at 1949, when the Indiana legislature
proscribed the practice by law - now IND. CODE §§ 20-8-6-1 to 20-8-6-7 (1971), IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 28-6106 to 28-6112 (1970). 213 F. Supp. at 822. But Gary actually
changed over in 1947; indeed, the impetus provided by the attendant publicity led
directly to the state law's enactment two years later. Kaplan III, supra note 48, at 125
& n.22.
69. 213 F. Supp. at 822.
70. Wolff, Segregation in the Schools of Gary, Indiana, 36 J. EDUC. SOc. 251,
254 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Wolff].
71. Kaplan III, supra note 48, at 124.
72. Id. at 125. Against this background, it bordered on the sheerest hypocrisy for
the superintendent of schools to assert in 1950 that
Roosevelt School is still completely negro, but it is negro because no white
children live in the district surrounding the school [and] not because we
have a policy of not allowing white children to attend that school.
Id. at 126 n.24.
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However, the Gary board of education refused to steer its course by
maximum feasible integration. In order to funnel the children from the
black Dorie Miller housing project into mainly black Roosevelt High
School, the school authorities adjusted the attendance boundary between
it and predominately white Emerson in 1953."' They built Locke High
School in 1957 to relieve overcrowding at Washington. By 1962, in no
small measure due to the division of the old Washington district along
19th Avenue rather than Whitcombe Street, 4 Locke had become 100
per cent black and Washington 76 per cent white."5 Such board policies
uniformly cultivated a fully blooming racial imbalance: seventeen of the
city's forty schools enrolled 97 per cent of the system's 23,000 blacks
in 1963. Sixteen thousand of them went to schools 99 per cent black in
composition, and the schools attended by another 3,000 were 95 per cent
or more black."'
Genuinely unadulterated de facto segregation is not unconstitu-
tional. But to concede the absence of a duty to achieve racial balance in
these specific narrowly circumscribed premises is not to say that a board
of education may deliberately pursue policies whose practical effect is to
produce racial segregation in the schools. "It is incumbent upon .
court[s] to weigh . . . the facts at hand," and to consider alternatives
shown to have been both "feasible and more promising" than actions
in fact taken to implement Brown. This the Bell court did not do, but
rather accepted at face value the justifications proffered by the school
authorities. In consequence, the passage of time has imparted a hollow
ring to the finely tuned phrases of Bell."'
73. 213 F. Supp. at 823-24. They sought to justify their decision on the patently
specious ground that children from such closely knit communities should attend the
same school. The line of demarcation previously ran through the center of the
project. Therefore, had it not been adjusted, presumably approximately half the pro-
ject's children would have attended Emerson rather than Roosevelt.
74. 213 F. Supp. at 824-25. See Kaplan III, szpra note 48, at 140, map II.
75. Feeder patterns further aggravated the racial imbalance in Gary high schools.
Consider the integrated Chase Elementary School. It sent its white graduates to 99
per cent white Mann, while its blacks vent to 77 per cent black Tolleston. Wolff,
supra note 70, at 253, 255.
76. Kaplan II, supra note 28, at 158; Kaplan III, supra note 48, at 127, chart
II. Such statistics alone might be enough to raise a presumption of segregation.
See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S.
22, 23 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345
U.S. 559, 562-63 (1953); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1947); Hill
v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 405-06 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596, 598
(1935). See generally Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cmi. L. Rv.
235 (1971).
77. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). Cf. People v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 19 Cal. App. 3d 252, 265-66, 96 Cal. Rptr. 658, 666 (1972).
78. Bell's progeny display similar quanta of official discrimination. Consider
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Where courts have treated de facto segregation as though it were de
jure, the facts on which they relied in most cases would have satisfied
the requirements of the analysis put forward in this note."9 Keyes v.
School District No., 1, Denver, Colorado,"0 is illustrative. In that case,
clear "patterns of segregation reinforced by official action"'" on the part
of the school authorities penned the rapid growth of the city's black popu-
lation82 into racially identifiable schools.
Colorado Boulevard marked the eastern edge of the Denver ghetto
Bryant v. Board of Educ., 274 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). After the board excised
two blocks from Hale High School's district, the district's quotient of black dwelling
units mushroomed from 35 per cent to 56 per cent. For Judge van Pelt Bryan to
have dismissed the allegation that these blocks were white as unsubstantiated specula-
tion flies in the face of common sense! It is true that the board mapped compact,
contiguous attendance zones in 1955, and that the 1945 redistricting had actually
improved racial balance in the Mount Vernon schools. However, the number of black
homes in Hale's zone increased nearly two-thirds as a direct result of the board's
action. That should have imposed a duty on the school authorities to dismantle racial
imbalance at Hale, for "history is made, and constitutional rights vindicated, by deeds,
not talk, resolutions, and fine phrases." Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181,
193 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
79. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897 (6th Cir.), on remand, 40 U.S.L.W.
2192 (E.D. Mich. 1970), remanded, 438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir.), final jiudgment on the
merits, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971), final decree entered, 345 F. Supp. 914
(E.D. Mich.), affd in. part and remanded in part, No. 72-1809 (6th Cir., Dec. 8,
1972), motion for rehearing "en ban" granted, No. 72-1814 (6th Cir., Jan. 16, 1973) :
Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal.),
appeal docketed sub nom. Jones v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., No. 71-1877
(9th Cir., July 29, 1971), stay denied sub nwm. Lee v. Johnson, 92 S. Ct. 14 (1971)
(Douglas, Circuit Justice); United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp.
655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), aff'd, No. 71-1461 (7th Cir., Feb. 2, 1973); Davis v. School
Dist., 309 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 913 (1971); Kelly v. Brown, Civil No. LV-1146 (D. Nev., Dec. 2, 1970),
aff'd sub nom. Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 41
U.S.L.W. 3114 (U.S. Aug. 28, 1972) (No. 72-341); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), affd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ;
United States v. School Dist. 151, 268 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, 404 F.2d
1125 (7th Cir.), permanent injunction granted, 301 F. Supp. 201 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
modified and af'd, 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. dentied, 402 U.S. 943 (1971);
Taylor v. Board of Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), final decree entered, 195 F.
Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 (1961).
Barksdale v. Springfield School Comm., 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), appeal
dismissed as moot, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965), is the sole exception. Judge Sweeney's
syllogism moves directly from its major premise, that the predominantly black schools
in Springfield ranked lowest on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills, to its conclusion
without a showing of overtly disingenuous board action.
80. 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo.), preliminary injunction modified, 303 F. Supp.
289 (D. Colo. 1969), final judgment on the nerits, 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo.), final
decree entered, 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970), affd in part and rev'd ih part, 445
F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036 (1972) (No. 71-507).
81. 303 F. Supp. at 284 (emphasis added).
82. It increased from 8,000 in 1940 to 15,000 in 1950, to 30,000 in 1960, to
approximately 45,000 in 1966, and to 56,491 in 1970. 445 F.2d at 997; U.S. BuREAu
OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF CommERcE, PHC(2)-(7), 1970 CENsus OF POPULATiol
AND HOUSING: COLORADO 10 (1971).
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when the school authorities began to plan the Barrett Elementary School
in 1950. The Denver school board nonetheless fixed Colorado as the east-
ern boundary of Barrett's attendance zone, ignoring strident black pro-
tests, 3 and Barrett opened its doors in 1960 to a student body already
89.6 per cent black. Safety considerations did not loom large in that deci-
sion. Although Colorado is a six-lane highway, similar thorough-
fares bisected 18 other primary school districts in Denver at that time. 4
Also, Barrett's small size is not explained by the board's assertion that
it was built to accommodate overcrowding at surrounding schools. These
excess enrollments aggegated 617 pupils, but Barrett had only 450 seats.
And in point of fact, it operated 113 per cent of capacity itself in 1960.8"
To characterize the racial imbalance at Barrett as wholly adventitious
would sweep these facts under the rug. 6
Besides the Barrett situation, the Denver board of education likewise
moved affirmatively to clear the way for discrimination in inner-city
schools. Williams and High Streets bounded both the black population
and the eastern fringe of the Manual High School district in 1953, but the
blacks penetrated to York Street over the next three years. In the teeth
of black opposition,87 the school authorities advanced the Manual line to
83. The board had owned the site at 29th and Jackson, on which it built
Barrett, since 1949. However, two of its other properties east of Colorado Boulevard
would have served the area equally well and also, by including white neighborhoods
in the new district, would have made Barrett a de facto integrated school. 313 F.
Supp. at 65 & n.3. This admitted fact prompted the black community to publicly air
its resentment at Barrett's location where the clearly apparent trend of black migra-
tion g-uaranteed that it would soon become black. The board, thus forewarned of the
substantially certain effects of its decision, would later be estopped from denying
knowledge of them.
84. 313 F. Supp. at 65 & n.4. Two of these zones, Tedler and Steck, were
split by Colorado itself !
85. 445 F.2d at 1000 n.3.
86. The racial blend of the other schools in northeast Denver is no more a
function of spathaceous residential patterns alone than is Barrett's. The school
authorities attached the overwhelming white Hallett-Phillips zone to 100 per cent
white Phillips in 1962. Inasmuch as both schools had had ample room for their
students before, this only transplanted white children from a transitional area to a
"safe" enclave further east. 445 F.2d at 998. In 1964, the board incorporated an
eighty per cent white sector of Hallett's district - its highest concentration of
whites, 303 F. Supp. at 293 - into the Phillips zone and also placed a largely white
neighborhood excised from Stedman within Hallett's boundaries. It simultaneously
attached the 96 per cent white Stedman-Park Hill optional zone to 95 per cent white
Park Hill. These trimmings stablized Stedman as a black school and plummeted
Hallett from 68.5 to 41.5 per cent white in just one year.
87. 313 F. Supp. at 70. Vocal black dissent also greeted the expansion of Cole
Junior High School's boundaries from Race to York that same year. This transfer
of part of the Cole-Smiley optional zone to Cole forced black students within the
wedge to attend the rapidly changing Cole instead of predominantly white Smiley.
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York in 1956. The sixteen blocks between York and Colorado Boule-
vard were still white in the mid-1950's. Had the board extended the
Manual zone east to Colorado, it would have both integrated Manual
and eased overcrowding at predominantly white East High School. The
board's 1962 adjustments at Morey Junior High,8  while apparently
neutral on their face, also evidence racial motivation. After some whites
remonstrated that Morey would emerge as a minority school, the educa-
tion authorities shifted their neighborhood from Morey's zone into the
mainly white Byers district.
In 1969, these perfoliate leaves of official discrimination coalesced
around the recission of Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531. In 1964,
board policy 5100 had endorsed "changes or adaptations [in neighbor-
hood attendance zones] which [would] result in a more diverse or
heterogeneous racial and ethnic school population"." In 1968, the school
authorities accordingly directed the superintendent to prepare plans to
eliminate racial imbalance in the Denver system. His blueprints, which
would have lowered its "segregation index" dramatically," crystallized
in the board's decision to reorganize attendance districts so that no
school would be more than twenty per cent non-white. However, the
specter of mandatory cross-busing led to the election of two new board
members pledged to preserve neighborhood schools,9 and the recon-
stituted majority promptly repealed each resolution individually by
votes of four to three.92 This "precipitate and unstudied action"93 re-
Not only did Smiley remain overcrowded afterwards, but the board also built an
addition to it in 1958 rather than channel the spill into Cole. Id. at 71 & n.14.
88. In dissolving its four optional zones, the school authorities spun off the
94 per cent white Morey-Hill and Morey-Byers zones to predominantly white Hill
and Byers and merged the minoiity-impacted Morey-Cole zone into Morey. But
they inserted the 75 per cent white Baker-Morey zone into Morey too. Therefore,
these changes seem to be racially impartial at first glance - even though Morey con-
sequently dropped from 65-80 per cent white to fifty per cent white in just one year.
313 F. Supp. at 71-72 & n.16.
89. Quoted in 445 F.2d at 996.
90. It would have declined from sixty to 43 in the elementary grades, from
65 to 35 in junior high schools, and from fifty to 28 at the high school level.
303 F. Supp. at 285.
91. 313 F. Supp. at 66. See also P. ScAmmoN & B. WATrEtNBuRG, THE REAL
MAYORITY 257-66 (1970). Following its appearance in United States v. Board of
School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Ind. 1971), the Committee for Neighborhood
Schools likewise captured all seven board seats in Indianapolis. Indianapolis Star,
May 6, 1971, at 1, col. 4. See generally Pindur, Legislative and Judicial Roles in
the Detroit School Decentralization Controversy, 50 J. UEAN LAw 53, 59-69 (1972);
NEwSWEEK, Nov. 6, 1967, at 29.
92. 303 F. Supp. at 284.
93. Id. at 288.
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stored and perpetuated de facto school segregation in Denver."4
The quantum of official discrimination on the part of the school
authorities does not always equal the pointillism of Keyes. However, the
faintest trace of racially motivated board action should be fatal to other-
wise unadulterated de facto segregation. That action should be uncon-
stitutional per se-whether it "be wholly nascent or abortive on the one
hand, or successful on the other."9 As justice Field put it:
[W]e cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and
general cognizance. When [judges] take their seats on the
bench [they] are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to
know as judges what [they] see as men; . . .
Banks v. Muncie Community School" illustrates the suggested
reach of such a per se rule. As the fnal step in replacing the city's con-
solidated high school with a three-school system, the Muncie board of
education planned to open Northwest High in a white area in the fall of
1970. That would have ruptured the existing racial balance in the
secondary schools. Alternate locations would have produced some degree
of integration-in-fact,98 and the inference that the board intended North-
94.
Racial and Ethnic Composition of Selected Schools
As Influenced by Resolutions 1520, 1524, and 1531
If Resolutions Used Resolutions Not Used
Total Anglo Negro Total Anglo Negro
School No. No. % No. % No. No. % No. %
East High 2,600 1,776 68 649 25 2,623 1,409 54 1,039 40
Byers Junior High 1,241 1,053 85 110 9 1,138 1,053 93 7 1
Cole Junior High 944 9 1 661 70 1,219 46 4 884 73
Smiley Junior High 1,333 960 72 306 23 1,553 367 24 1,112 72
Barrett Elementary 368 269 73 88 24 423 1 0 410 97
Park Hill Elementary 863 682 79 112 13 963 684 71 223 23
Phillips Elementary 584 409 70 128 23 555 307 55 203 37
Stedman Elementary 566 27 5 514 91 686 27 4 634 92
445 F.2d at 1008-09 (tables condensed; Chicano data omitted). On similar facts,
the Sixth Circuit refused a stay in Oliver v. School Dist., 448 F.2d 635 (6th Cir.
1971). See also Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483, 507-08,
279 A.2d 619, 623-25 (1971). But see Gomperts v. Chase, 92 S. Ct. 16 (1971) (Douglas,
Circuit justice).
95. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-27 n.59 (1940);
cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 305 (1966) (White, J., concurring).
96. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (No. 6,546) (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
97. 433 F.2d (7th Cir. 1970).
98. The neighboring "Whitely Area!' and "Industry Area" were both black.
Id. at 293. Therefore, to have sited Northwest on their fringes would have reduced
its racially identifiable nature somewhat. Muncie Central had been de facto integrated
when all students in the system attended high school there, and, even after Southside
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west to be a white school is further strengthened by its refusal to provide
transportation for the blacks whom it envisioned assigning there from
outside the district. Such facts would clearly fall within the ambit of the
proposed per se rule. Thus, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion than Banks
was "unfounded" or "premature" 9 is erroneous.
CONCLUSION
The approach proposed in this note will almost always lead to a
finding that de facto segregation is unconstitutional. Yet the capricious
exception cannot be discounted. A community's policitical organs could
manipulate land-use policies in order to blatantly foster residential segre-
gation, while its education authorities did nothing to independently en-
hance racial imbalance in the schools. Why should such a locality escape
the rigors of court-supervised integration? It is a fair question. As
Ramsey Clark has pointed out,' the equities are closely balanced here.
Other state agencies do as much to influence segregation-in-fact in the
schools as boards of education.' However, the identity of the agency
involved is critical. De facto segregation is rooted, not only in race, but
also in a myriad of socio-economic factors. To place the onus of cutting
that Gordian knot on the board of education alone is unfair unless its ac-
tions have contributed to the situation.
High had been built pursuant to the decentralization plan, each school was 13 per cent
black until the construction of Northwest.
99. 433 F.2d at 294. Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 384
F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967), and Sealey v. Department of Public Instruction, 159 F. Supp.
561 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 252 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958),
are clearly distinguishable. The residential patterns involved therein were such that
no alternate sites would have resulted in less racial imbalance than the ones in fact
chosen.
100. Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Education Opportunity,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. IIIC, at 1613 (1970).
101. For instance, when the Chicago Housing Authority built the Robert Taylor
Homes Complex, it did more than any other single state agency to perpetuate school
segregation on the city's South Side. Campbell, School-Community Collaboration it
Our Cities, in WHITE HousE CONFERENCE ON EDucAToIN: A MILESTONE FOR EDUCA-
'TIONAL PROGRESS 155, 158 (1965). Public housing had similar effects in Cincinnati,
Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 419 F.2d 1387, 1400 (6th Cir. 1969) ; in Gary, Bell
v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819, 823-24 (N.D. Ind. 1963); in Indianapolis, United
States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 673-74 (S.D. Ind. 1971) ; in New
Rochelle, New York, Kaplan I, supra note 60, at 6 n.13; in Orange, New Jersey,
Fisher v. Board of Educ., 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 731, 733 (N.J. Comm'r of Educ. 1963) ;
and in Poughkeepsie, New York, Johnson v. Hunger, 266 F. Supp. 590, 591 (S.D.N.Y.
1967). Cf. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213, 220 n.12 (D.
Conn. 1969). See also Downs v. Board of Educ., 336 F.2d 988, 992 (10th Cir. 1964)
(slum clearance program) ; Gomperts v. Chase, 92 S. Ct. 16, 17 (1971) (Douglas,
Circuit Justice) (freeway construction).
102. Of course, this runs the risk of having one result in a case set against a
Southern de jure background and an opposite outcome in de facto Northern contexts.
Compare Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 326-35 (1964) (Black, Harlan, & White, JJ.,
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At the same time, a word of caution is in order. This note attempts
only to pinpoint the line that the school authorities may not cross without
transgressing the Constitution. What they may undertake in order to
maximize integration is another matter. Race is a suspect classification
that
the Constitution usually forbids, not because it is inevitably an
impermissable classification, but because it is one which usually,
to our national shame, has been drawn for the purpose of main-
taining racial inequality.3
0 3
A classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden
must not be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color-blind.'"
But it is color-conscious in order to promote equality. In view of the psy-
chological damage worked by schools segregated-in-fact, legislatures and
school boards ought to be able to take the actualities of segregation into
account in order to promote long-term integration. 3 Our analysis places
no restriction on "voluntary state action aimed toward reducing and
eventually eliminating de facto school segregation."'08
dissenting), with Karst, .rupra note 56. That is doubly ironic, for the earliest reported
decision upholding school segregation is Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5
Cush.) 193 (1850) ! However, the analysis developed in this note will reach all but
an infinitesimal number of cases. Only Griggs v. Cook, 272 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ga.),
aff'd, 334 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1967); Blocker v. Board of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1964); and Sealey v. Department of Public Instruction, 159 F. Supp. 561
(E.D. Pa.), af'd, 252 F.2d 878 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958), would
have fallen outside its pale.
103. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32
(2d Cir. 1968).
104. A series of per curiam decisions citing Brozon made this clear. Schiro v.
Bynum, U.S. 395 (1964) (municipal auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61
(1963) (courtroom seating); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (air-
port restaurant) ; State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (athletic
contests) ; New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(public recreational facilities) ; Gayle v Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses);
Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (public golf course) ; Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n,
347 U.S. 971 (1954) (leasing publicly-owned ampitheatre). Furthermore, even if
privileges are conferred rather than disadvantages imposed, they must be made accessi-
ble to all in a manner that does not discriminate on the basis 6f race. Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Priilege Distinction in Conwtitutional Law, 81 HARv. L.
RE,. 1439, 1454-57 (1968). Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).
105. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971);
Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), aff'd,
423 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1970). Cf. Porcelli v. Titus, 302 F. Supp. 726 (D.N.J. 1969),
aff'd, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971). See generally
Vieria, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible Classification by Race, 67
MiCrr. L. REv. 1553 (1969).
106. Tometz v. Board of Educ. of the Waukegan City School Dist., 39 Ill. 2d 593,
597, 237 N.E.2d 498, 501 (1968).
